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ELONIS V. UNITED STATES: THE NEED TO UPHOLD INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH WHILE PROTECTING 
VICTIMS OF ONLINE TRUE THREATS 
ALISON J. BEST∗ 
In American society, social networking sites and other online forums 
dominate modern communication.  As of December 2015, over one billion 
people worldwide actively used Facebook on a daily basis.1  The increased 
frequency with which individuals use the Internet as a primary means of 
communication has profoundly changed the level of access people have to 
posts, updates, and statements made on social media profiles.2  Because 
online communications tend to allow individuals to post their thoughts on a 
widely accessible network, courts have seen a rise in “true threat” litigation 
over the past decade, which evaluates whether statements communicated by 
an individual qualify as threats.3  Courts have wrestled with several 
complex issues regarding Internet communications, and they have 
particularly struggled with how to apply federal statutes prohibiting true 
threats in ways that do not impermissibly limit the First Amendment right 
to free speech.4  As the Supreme Court has not announced a clear formula 
for how to interpret threatening statements on social networking sites, 
substantial ambiguity persists regarding what content individuals may post 
without risking criminal prosecution.5 
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 1.  Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 2.  See Adrienne Scheffey, Defining Intent in 165 Characters or Less: A Call for Clarity in 
the Intent Standard of True Threats After Virginia v. Black, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 861, 867 (2015) 
(stating the “prevalence of, and access to, widespread speech is unprecedented worldwide with 
millions of users communicating daily through social media”). 
 3.  See id. at 864 (explaining “true threat cases are becoming more prevalent in light of the 
expansion of ubiquitous access to the Internet and social media”); see infra Part II.C (explaining 
that courts have found communications inciting violence and symbols of intimidation meant to 
instill fear of bodily harm to constitute true threats).   
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.  
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In Elonis v. United States,6 the Supreme Court had the chance to 
address this increasingly relevant issue in deciding whether an individual’s 
Facebook posts qualified as true threats.7  The Supreme Court erred by 
failing to concretely define the application of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c),8 
which prohibits the communication of true threats to speech transmitted 
through online social networking.9  The Court should have considered both 
the First Amendment implications and the question of which intent standard 
to apply when considering online posts as threats as one single issue.  
Because the Court chose, unfortunately, to separate these issues, it missed a 
vital opportunity to announce the proper intent standard under 18 U.S.C. 
Section 875(c).10  The lack of a concrete standard will lead to continued 
confusion both in lower courts and to individuals active in social media.11  
The Court should have adopted a hybrid reasonable-speaker and 
reasonable-recipient standard, which would best balance the dual interests 
of maintaining individual free speech rights while also protecting the public 
from true threats.12 
I. THE CASE 
In September 2013, Anthony Douglas Elonis was found guilty of 
violating 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c),13 which makes it a crime to 
communicate a “true threat” to injure another person.14  The charges alleged 
that Elonis had issued true threats over social media to his former co-
workers, law enforcement officers, an FBI agent, his ex-wife, and 
elementary school children.15  Elonis regularly used Facebook to publicly 
air his grievances to his “friends” on the site.16  In May 2010, Elonis’s wife 
and two children left him after almost seven years of marriage.17  After his 
                                                          
 6.  135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 7.  Id. at 2004. 
 8.  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 9.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.  
 11.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 12.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 13.  United States v. Elonis, No. 11-13, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2011).  Section 
875(c) states that “[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 
 14.  Id.  The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania posited that “[a] statement 
is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted 
by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intent to 
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”  Brief for Petitioner at 17, Elonis v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).  
 15.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 324. 
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family left him, Elonis started listening to violent rap music and eventually 
began to post lyrics of his own on his Facebook page.18  He posted these 
lyrics under his rap name and musical persona, “Tone Dougie.”19  Elonis’s 
violent lyrics were often accompanied by reminders that they were not 
intended to reflect actual people.20  He wrote that the posts allowed him to 
express himself and to move on from the pain caused by losing his family.21  
Elonis’s coworkers, employers, and ex-wife, however, considered Elonis’s 
Facebook activity dangerous and threatening.22 
The first post to warrant concern occurred after Elonis attended a 
Halloween event at the amusement park where he worked.23  Elonis posted 
a photo of himself and a coworker in which he held a knife to her throat.24  
Elonis captioned the photo “I Wish.”25  After viewing the photo on Elonis’s 
Facebook account, the Chief of Park Security fired him.26  Elonis 
subsequently posted a detailed response on his Facebook page, stating that 
he still had access to park facility keys.27  He wrote “Y’all think it’s too 
dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad as me. . . . 
Whoever thought the Halloween Haunt could be so f***ing scary?”28  
Following this post, Elonis was indicted for threatening park employees and 
customers.29 
In addition to Elonis’s Facebook posts regarding his former job, he 
routinely posted explicit material targeting his ex-wife.30  Elonis’s ex-wife 
viewed these posts and sought a Protection From Abuse order, which a state 
court granted.31  In one particular post, Elonis wrote that it would be illegal 
for him to say that someone should kill his ex-wife, but nevertheless legal 
for him to explain that illegality.32  He also stated that it would be illegal for 
him to say someone should kill his ex-wife with a mortar launcher.33  Elonis 
followed the post with a diagram and detailed directions about the best 
                                                          
 18.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 6–7.  
 19.  Id. at 7. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.  Elonis’s wife testified that Elonis had never listened to rap 
music or expressed any desire to write his own lyrics at any point during their marriage.  Id. at 
325. 
 23.  Id. at 324. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. at 326.  
 30.  Id. at 324–26. 
 31.  Id. at 324.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
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place someone could fire the launcher into his wife’s home.34  The post was 
based on a stand-up comedy routine, and Elonis provided a link to the 
original skit, accompanied by a statement that he was “willing to go to jail 
for [his] constitutional rights.”35  Shortly after his ex-wife obtained the 
Protection From Abuse order, Elonis wrote another violent post from his 
Tone Dougie account.36  The post referred to the order, asking, “[i]s it thick 
enough to stop a bullet?”37  He also mentioned having “enough explosives 
to take care of the state police and the sheriff’s department,” which 
prompted the third count of Elonis’s indictment for threatening law 
enforcement officers.38 
In addition to posting lyrics directed towards his ex-wife and the local 
police department, Elonis used his Tone Dougie page to write that there 
were “[e]nough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most 
heinous school shooting ever imagined.”39  This post prompted the FBI to 
monitor Elonis’s online activity more closely.40  When agents encountered 
more posts alluding to school shootings, they visited Elonis at his home.41  
Immediately following the in-person visit, Elonis posted original lyrics 
entitled “Little Agent Lady.”42  The lyrics contained graphic descriptions 
about wanting to slit one of the agent’s throats and “[l]eave her bleedin’ 
from her jugular in the arms of her partner.”43  Elonis referenced plans to 
strap himself with a bomb and detonate the explosives if police placed him 
under arrest.44  He wrote, “I’m just a crazy sociopath . . . .  I’m gonna be 
famous [c]ause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes the attention who 
happens to be under investigation for terrorism.”45 
Facebook posts related to Elonis’s ex-wife, the local police station, the 
FBI agent, and local elementary schools provided the basis of an indictment 
against Elonis for making threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c).46  
Section 875(c) makes it a crime to communicate true threats in interstate 
commerce.47  Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment in the District Court 
                                                          
 34.  Id. at 324–25.  
 35.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 12.  The routine involved a satirical approach by 
comedian Trevor Moore to explain the illegality of threatening to kill the president.  Id. at 10. 
 36.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324. 
 37.  Id. at 325.  
 38.  Id. at 326.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 14. 
 43.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 15–16. 
 46.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326. 
 47.  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) states that “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign 
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure 
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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing that it failed to accuse him 
of intending to threaten anyone.48  The district court denied this motion and 
upheld the Third Circuit precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. Section 875 as 
not requiring a finding that Elonis intended to threaten anyone, but only 
requiring a finding that he made the communication.49  Elonis later 
requested a jury instruction that would have required the government to 
show that Elonis subjectively intended his posts as real threats.50  The 
district court denied the request, and instead defined a true threat as a 
statement made intentionally by the defendant “wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the 
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention 
to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”51  The jury found 
Elonis guilty on four out of five counts of the indictment, and he was 
sentenced to three years and eight months in jail and three years of 
supervised release.52 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
Elonis again challenged the jury instructions provided by the district 
court.53  He stressed that the jury should have been required to find that he 
intended his online posts as true threats.54  The Third Circuit rejected this 
argument and declined to apply a subjective intent standard.55  Instead, it 
reiterated that the proper standard for intent under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) 
is that the defendant made the communication intentionally, and that a 
reasonable person would interpret the statement as a threat.56  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine the proper intent standard for a threat 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c).57 
                                                          
the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.” 
 48.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327.  
 49.  Id.  The Court applied a “general intent” standard, in which a statement would qualify as 
a true threat if a reasonable person would have understood the communication as a threat.  Id.  
Rather than considering whether Elonis subjectively intended his posts to be interpreted as threats, 
the general intent standard applied by the district court only considers culpability from an 
objective perspective.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 327.  
 51.  Id. The government provided as witnesses several of the individuals mentioned in 
Elonis’s posts, including his ex-wife, all of whom testified that they considered Elonis’s posts 
threats.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 17–18.  Elonis argued, unsuccessfully, that his 
lyrics resembled those of many other popular rappers, and helped him cope with the instability in 
his life.  Id. at 6–7. 
 52.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 327–28.  
 57.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 875 governs the class of statements that do not enjoy First 
Amendment protections because they constitute true threats.58  The statute 
provides that “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to 
injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than twenty years, or both.”59  Historically, the Supreme Court has 
treated true threats as a category of speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment.60  When analyzing statutory provisions that reference true 
threats, however, the Court has applied varying intent standards to the 
crimes, without referencing the First Amendment implications of these 
statements.61  Parts II.A–B will address how the Supreme Court has 
analyzed criminal statutes that fail to delineate a requisite mental state, and 
how the Court has traditionally held that criminal law requires some level 
of intent.62  Part II.C will then explore recent, major developments to the 
true threat doctrine by examining Supreme Court precedent.63  Finally, Part 
II.D will address the circuit split regarding the proper intent requirement to 
apply 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) and will consider what statements have 
qualified as true threats in the circuits.64 
A.  The Omission of an Intent Requirement in a Criminal Statute Does 
Not Automatically Render the Prohibited Behavior a General Intent 
Crime 
One hallmark feature separating criminal law from other types of 
misconduct is the requirement that the defendant acted with a level of intent 
when committing the unlawful act.65  Statutes typically require either a 
“general intent” or a “specific intent” standard.66  In the context of true 
threats, a general, or objective intent requirement means a statement would 
qualify as a true threat if a reasonable person would have understood the 
communication as a threat.67  A specific or subjective intent standard would 
consider whether the speaker subjectively intended her posts to be 
                                                          
 58.  18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  See infra Part II.C. 
 61.  See infra Part II.D. 
 62.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 63.  See infra Part II.C. 
 64.  See infra Part II.D. 
 65.  Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952). 
 66.  See infra Part II.B. 
 67.  See infra Part II.D. 
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interpreted as threats and would require more than an objective showing of 
intent.68 
In Morissette v. United States,69 the United States Supreme Court 
assessed how to interpret criminal statutes lacking an explicit intent 
standard.  It held that a court should presume the statute requires some 
mental element, even if Congress did not include one.70  The defendant in 
Morissette came across a government-owned bombing test site where he 
found several shells he believed to be abandoned.71  Unaware that the 
government owned the property, the defendant removed several shells from 
the field and took them to a nearby metal processing plant to exchange the 
metal for cash.72  The defendant was subsequently charged under 18 
U.S.C. Section 641, which states: “whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or 
knowingly converts government property is punishable by fine and 
imprisonment.”73 
Because the statute itself did not specify what level of intent must be 
proven, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied a general intent 
standard, and held that the word “knowingly” only applied to the fact that 
the defendant knew he was removing the shells from the field.74  The 
Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s application of a 
general intent standard to Section 641, and focused its analysis of the 
importance of intent in criminal law.75  Ultimately, the Morissette Court 
ruled that “[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention . . . is as universal and persistent in mature systems of 
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and 
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”76 
                                                          
 68.  See United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1992), abrogated by United 
States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining the “difference between a specific 
intent and general intent crime involves the way in which the intent is proved—whether by 
probing the defendant’s subjective state of mind or whether by objectively looking at the 
defendant’s behavior in the totality of the circumstances” (citing United States v. Hoffman, 806 
F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986))). 
 69.  342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 70.  Id. at 263 (holding that “mere omission . . . of any mention of intent will not be construed 
as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced”). 
 71.  Id. at 247. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012) (emphasis added)).  
 74.  Id. at 249–50.  The Court of Appeals framed the issue as a question of whether the 
government only had to prove that Mr. Morissette intended to remove the property from the field, 
or whether the government had to prove he possessed a “felonious intent” to remove the 
government’s property.  Id. at 249. 
 75.  Id. at 260–61.  By tracing the history of larceny and other theft offenses throughout the 
common law, the Supreme Court highlighted the engrained practice of applying a mens rea in 
order to convict a person for those crimes, even though the statute failed to explicitly state an 
intent requirement.  Id.  
 76.  Id. at 250. 
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The fundamental difference between criminal and civil charges, the 
Supreme Court reasoned, rests on whether a person has a guilty mind when 
committing the offense.77  Based on this long-established principle, the 
Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that the lack of an 
explicit intent requirement within the statute required them to apply a 
general intent standard.78  The Morissette Court held that a general intent 
standard in this case was insufficient to ensure that a defendant had 
consciously violated the law, and therefore a subjective requirement was 
required.79  Although the statute itself failed to announce an explicit level of 
intent, the Court interpreted the statute as requiring subjective intent, and 
thereby reversed Morissette’s conviction.80 
B.  If a Particular Reading of a Statute Would Criminalize Innocent 
Behavior, the Court Should Infer That Congress Intended the 
Statute to Require an Element of Subjective Intent 
In Staples v. United States,81 the Supreme Court built on Morissette’s 
principle that criminal statutes lacking an explicit intent standard should be 
interpreted as requiring subjective intent.82  In Staples, the defendant faced 
charges under the National Firearms Act, which prohibits possessing a 
machine gun unless that person has properly registered it with the federal 
government.83  The charges arose from an incident in which the police 
searched the defendant’s home and found a weapon they suspected had 
been modified to have automatic firing capability.84  Admitting that he had 
not properly registered the weapon, the defendant nonetheless argued he 
was unaware that the weapon had automatic firing capabilities and that he 
had never used it in that capacity.85  Because he did not know about the 
weapon’s modification and had not registered it with the federal 
government, the defendant pled not guilty.86 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Staples by once again turning 
to case precedent showing that statutes without a mens rea requirement are 
largely disfavored.87  To accept the government’s argument that this statute 
                                                          
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 276.  
 79.  Id. at 271, 273–76. 
 80.  Id. at 276. 
 81.  511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 602. The National Firearms Act also failed to delineate an explicit intent 
requirement.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 603. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 604–05 (citing Liparota v. United States, 71 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)); see also United 
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 254 (1922) (holding that criminal statutes typically require 
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only required general intent, the Court held that it would need evidence of 
Congress’ intent not to require an express mental state.88  To discern 
whether Congress truly intended a statute to have no intent requirement, the 
Court further held that it must examine the nature of the subject matter 
being regulated.89  The Court reasoned that when a statute regulates an 
extremely dangerous activity, or one that places the public in danger, it can 
assume that Congress “intended to place the burden on the defendant to 
‘ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes within the inhibition of 
the statute.’”90  The Court further reasoned that although society has a 
strong interest in the proper regulation of firearms, and that possession of 
automatic weapons qualifies as dangerous conduct, the defendant could not 
face charges because he did not know his actions violated the law.91  By 
holding that this statute implicitly required subjective intent, the Court 
expressed the importance of assuring that defendants facing criminal 
charges clearly intended to cause the harm the statute sought to prevent.92 
The Court’s decisions in Staples and Morissette emphasized the 
importance of separating innocent conduct from criminal behavior when 
evaluating statutes that are silent on intent.93  The Court reinforced this 
argument when it overturned a defendant’s conviction for fraudulent food 
stamp use in Liparota v. United States.94  At trial, Mr. Liparota requested a 
                                                          
some level of subjective intent because there is a strong interest in ensuring that individuals will 
not be punished for truly innocent behavior).  
 88.  Staples, 511 U.S. at 606.  A general intent standard would not require the government to 
prove that the defendant had knowledge of his weapon’s automatic firing capabilities.  Instead, it 
would only be required to show that the defendant knowingly possessed the gun.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 619 (holding that determining whether a statute requires general or specific intent 
“depends upon a commonsense evaluation of the nature of the particular device or substance 
Congress has subjected to regulation and the expectations that individuals may legitimately have 
in dealing with the regulated items”); see also Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (holding that statutes which 
regulate very dangerous materials may omit a subjective intent element, even if they impose 
stringent criminal punishments).  The Court also found that, in certain areas of regulation, when 
the public welfare is at risk and Congress has clearly indicated its commitment to protecting 
society’s interests over protecting those individuals whose innocent behavior might subject them 
to criminal punishments under the statute, the statute may be read as requiring only a showing of 
general intent.  Id. 
 90.  Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (quoting Balint, 258 U.S. at 254) (alteration in original).  
 91.  Id. at 611. 
 92.  Id. at 619–20 (holding that “the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts 
that make his conduct illegal should apply”). 
 93.  Id.  Throughout its analysis, the Court emphasized that it typically interprets statutes as 
requiring some element of subjective intent unless the statute regulates a highly dangerous 
activity.  This analysis reflects the principle that criminal conduct requires punishment, whereas 
innocent conduct does not.  Id.  
 94.  471 U.S. 419 (1985).  The defendant purchased food stamps from an undercover 
government agent, and was charged under the Food Stamp Fraud Statute, which punishes a person 
“wh[o] knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in 
any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations.”  Id. at 420–22 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 
2024(b)(1) (second alteration in original)). 
 1136 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1127 
jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he “knowingly did 
an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law.”95  The 
district court, however, had determined that the government only needed to 
show that the defendant acquired food stamps in a manner not authorized 
by the statute, and therefore his mental state did not affect whether his 
behavior qualified as criminal.96 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Liparota argued, and the Court 
accepted, that the statute had to contain an implicit mens rea requirement 
because otherwise it would “criminalize a broad range of apparently 
innocent conduct.”97  Specifically, the unclear instructions provided by the 
statute on how to legally obtain food stamps created opportunities for 
individuals to mistakenly violate the law by obtaining stamps from 
unauthorized sources.98  Because of this confusing structure, the Court 
found that the statute too often resulted in criminalization of innocent 
conduct.99  The Liparota Court held that the government did not have to 
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the specific rules governing the 
purchase of food stamps, but it did have to prove that the defendant knew 
his conduct was wrong.100  Because the government failed to demonstrate 
that the defendant knew his method of purchasing food stamps violated the 
law, the Supreme Court overturned Mr. Liparota’s conviction.101  In so 
doing, the Court reinforced the principle that it may interpret a statute as 
requiring subjective intent, even if Congress has not named an explicit 
intent standard.102 
C.  Both Congress and the Courts Have Failed to Express a Clear 
Intent Requirement for the Communication of True Threats 
The Supreme Court affords broad protections to speech under the First 
Amendment,103 in order for a communication to fall outside First 
Amendment protection, the speech must constitute a true threat.104  
Categories of speech which the Court has previously held to constitute true 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 422. 
 96.  Id. at 422–23. 
 97.  Id. at 426. 
 98.  Id. at 426–27. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 434 (arguing that this proof may be established “by reference to facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct was unauthorized or 
illegal”). 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. at 426.  
 103.  See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (holding that mere advocacy of the use of force 
or violence qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment). 
 104.  See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (holding that states may constitutionally restrict speech that 
represents an intention to cause bodily harm to a group or individual because those statements 
constitute true threats). 
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threats include speech inciting violence105 and symbols of intimidation 
intentionally meant to instill fear.106  Communications that merely express 
unpopular or offensive viewpoints do not constitute true threats.107 
The United States Supreme Court first used the term “true threats” in 
Watts v. United States,108 when it evaluated whether the defendant’s 
statements at a public, anti-war rally violated a federal statute prohibiting a 
person from “knowingly and willfully making any threat to take the life or 
to inflict bodily harm upon the president of the United States.”109  In 
holding that the defendant’s statements did not constitute true threats, the 
Supreme Court stressed the importance of protecting political speech, even 
though it can often be “vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”110 The Court’s 
decision in Watts exemplifies the Court’s commitment to protecting First 
Amendment rights, particularly with regard to speech that could be 
interpreted as unpopular.111  The Watts Court set a high bar for making a 
successful claim for a true threat. 
The Supreme Court continued to analyze threatening speech on very 
narrow grounds in Brandenburg v. Ohio,112 a case in which the petitioner 
spoke at a Ku Klux Klan rally and encouraged members to participate in 
upcoming marches and demonstrations.113  He also appeared in a film clip 
dressed in a Ku Klux Klan hood and expressed his frustrations that political 
and governmental leaders of the country were “suppress[ing] the white, 
Caucasian race” and that “there might have to be some revengeance[sic] 
taken.”114  The petitioner was convicted under Ohio’s Syndicalism statute, 
which made it a crime to “advocat[e] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of 
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform.”115 
                                                          
 105.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. 
 106.  Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
 107.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49. 
 108.  394 U.S. 705 (1969).  
 109.  Id. at 705 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012) (alteration in original)).  The defendant’s 
charges arose out of his statements at an anti-Vietnam war rally in which he was overheard saying 
“I am not going.  If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.”  Id. at 706. 
 110.  Id. at 708.  The Court emphasized that the offensive nature of political speech cannot on 
its own be a basis for censorship, but did not express a concrete standard under which to evaluate 
these classes of statements.  Id.  
 111.  Id. at 707 (holding that statutes which criminalize speech “must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind” because public debate is foundational to our 
society). 
 112.  395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 113.  Id. at 445. 
 114.  Id. at 446. 
 115.  Id. at 444–45 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13 (alteration in original)). 
 1138 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1127 
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio statute violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it punished “mere advocacy,” and because 
it made it a crime to assemble and advocate constitutionally protected 
views.116  It posited that, while the petitioner’s statements at the Ku Klux 
Klan rally promoted troublesome, white supremacist views, they did not 
actually incite any violence.117  The Court stressed that in order for 
statements of this class to fall outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, the petitioner’s speech would have had to amount to 
incitement.118  Although actual violence need not occur for a statement to 
qualify as incitement, the violence communicated must be imminently 
likely to occur.119  The Court’s reasoning in Brandenburg again reinforced 
that only a small category of truly threatening statements will be held to 
violate the First Amendment, and statutes that criminalize the advocacy of 
offensive beliefs will likely violate the Constitution.120 
Similarly, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,121 the Supreme 
Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited burning crosses by 
making it illegal to display any symbols that “arous[e] anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.”122  Because this statute criminalized the expression of personal 
views, the Court found it unconstitutional on its face.123  Although the 
R.A.V. Court explained that true threats do not enjoy free speech protection 
because their censorship “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, 
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that 
threatened violence will occur,” it held that the defendant’s cross burning 
did not rise to the level of a true threat.124  The Court emphasized, as it had 
in Watts and Brandenburg, that the offensive nature of a certain behavior or 
communication cannot, on its own, serve as the basis for censorship.125 
                                                          
 116.  Id. at 449. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 447–48.  The Court announced a two-part test for determining whether speech 
qualified as incitement, which required that both the communication be aimed at producing 
imminent lawless conduct, and that the lawless conduct be likely to occur as a result of the 
communication.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 449. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 122.  Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). 
 123.  Id. at 381.  
 124.  Id. at 388 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)).  The Court did not 
elaborate on, nor provide a rule regarding at which point the defendant’s behavior would 
constitute a true threat, however.   
 125.  Id. at 382 (citing, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–11 (1940); then citing 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)). 
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In Virginia v. Black,126 the Supreme Court addressed another state 
statute that made cross burning illegal, and clarified the current standard 
under which a practice might constitute a true threat.127  The Court held that 
while statutes may criminalize efforts to intimidate or instill fear in another 
person, displaying an offensive symbol used historically for intimidation 
does not in itself constitute a true threat.128  In contrast with the St. Paul 
City ordinance in R.A.V., which criminalized all acts of cross burning, the 
Virginia statute at issue in this case defined the illegal behavior as cross 
burning with “an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”129  At 
trial, the judge instructed the jury that the act of burning a cross constituted 
prima facie evidence of an “intent to intimidate,” and so the defendant 
could be found guilty as long as the jury concluded that the defendant 
burned a cross.130  The Supreme Court held that while a state may enact a 
statute that bans cross burning, this particular statute was over-broad, and 
therefore violated the First Amendment.131 
In holding that the Virginia statute violated the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that an act of intimidation must amount to a true 
threat in order to constitute a crime.132  In the context of this particular 
statute, the Court announced that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of 
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”133  The Supreme Court had never applied an element 
of subjective intent to its definition of true threats prior to this case.134  
However, the Court stressed that states may ban intimidating behavior, as 
long as those statutes do not criminalize innocent behavior on the grounds 
that many individuals find that behavior offensive.135  Because the act of 
burning crosses does not always imply “an intent to intimidate,” the Court 
held that the statute violated the First Amendment because it posed a risk of 
                                                          
 126.  538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 127.  Id. at 347–48. 
 128.  Id. at 363.  
 129.  Id. at 362–63. 
 130.  Id. at 350–51.  The jury instruction read that the “burning of a cross by itself is sufficient 
evidence from which you may infer the required intent.”  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 348, 364 (holding that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute 
impermissible under the First Amendment because it removed any element of mens rea from the 
criminal act, and because burning crosses does not always carry with it an intent to intimidate 
particular people). 
 132.  Id. at 359. 
 133.  Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)). 
 134.  See, e.g., id. at 359–60 (holding that a defendant need not intend to carry out the threat in 
order to be convicted for communicating a true threat). 
 135.  Id. at 358 (noting that the First Amendment does not allow a state the “power to prohibit 
dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens 
believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring))). 
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imposing criminal penalties on those whose conduct did not actually fall 
under the statute.136 
D.  The Court’s Use of a Subjective Intent Component in Its Definition 
of a True Threat in Virginia v. Black Has Led to a Circuit Split  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, the 
definition of a true threat had never included an express reference to a 
subjective intent standard.137  Because Supreme Court precedent regarding 
true threats has focused on a wide variety of issues, ranging from statements 
made in public debates to traditionally intimidating behavior, little direction 
exists for courts to determine the proper intent requirement to apply to true 
threats.138  Due to the lack of clear Supreme Court decisions regarding this 
issue, the circuits are split on whether to apply an objective, a subjective, or 
a combination of both objective and subjective standards of intent to true 
threat cases.139 
1.  The Majority of Circuits Apply an Objective, Reasonable-
Recipient Standard When Evaluating Criminal Intent in a True 
Threat Statute 
As statutes criminalizing true threats typically do not contain explicit 
intent requirements, many circuits have relied on the presumption that such 
statutes only require general intent.140  The circuits that apply general intent 
requirements to true threats use a reasonable person standard in evaluating 
whether a communication constitutes a true threat.141  For example, in 
United States v. DeAndino,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that the proper standard from which to evaluate a 
communication as a threat is by an objective, general intent standard.  The 
court framed this inquiry by asking whether “a reasonable person would 
                                                          
 136.  Id. at 365–66. 
 137.  Id. at 359. 
 138.  See supra Part II.C–D. 
 139.  See supra Part II.C.  
 140.  See United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a “general 
rule of construction of criminal statutes [is] that where a statute does not specify a heightened 
mental element such as specific intent, general intent is presumed to be the required element” 
(citing United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 178–79 (5th Cir. 1989); then citing United States v. 
Nelson, 733 F.2d 364, 370–71 (5th Cir. 1984); and citing United States v. Barber, 594 F.2d 1242, 
1244 (9th Cir. 1979))).  
 141.  See United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that true threats 
should be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person viewing the communication). 
 142.  Id.  This case has since been abrogated by United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663 (6th 
Cir. 2015), which was decided after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Elonis v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), and therefore was prohibited from applying a purely objective 
intent standard.  
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consider the statement to be a threat.”143  The Sixth Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s argument that general intent statutes heighten the risk that 
individuals might be punished for innocent deeds.  Instead, the court 
reasoned that a defendant could present a defense that her acts constituted 
innocent deeds regardless of whether she was being charged for a general or 
a specific intent crime.144  The Sixth Circuit held that, based on the plain 
language of the statute which did not mention any specific intent 
requirement, the statute must be read as a general intent crime.145  This 
argument mirrors those adopted by other circuits relying on an objective 
standard of intent for true threats.146 
2.  Some Courts Apply an Objective Reasonable-Speaker Standard 
The First Circuit favors an objective, reasonable-speaker standard as 
opposed to an objective, reasonable-recipient standard because the 
reasonable-speaker standard provides protection against juries basing their 
decisions on sympathy.147  In United States v. Fulmer,148 the First Circuit 
upheld jury instructions defining the intent requirement as such that “a 
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would convey to the 
recipient a seriousness of purpose and the apparent prospect of 
execution.”149  The court found that the proper intent standard for true 
threats must contain some element of the defendant’s own intentions for his 
or her actions, but that a purely subjective standard would be too difficult 
for a prosecutor to prove.150  The court reasoned that if a jury could find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the speaker should have foreseen his words 
as a threat, the conviction would stand.151 It explained that the jury could 
base its conclusion on all the circumstances surrounding the 
                                                          
 143.  DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 147–48.  The defendant in this case was charged with violating 18 
U.S.C. § 875(c), after stating to a man that he was going to “blow his brains out” and that the man 
was “going to die.”  Id. at 147.  The district court applied a specific intent requirement, holding 
that in order to convict the defendant, the jury had to find that “the defendant knowingly and 
willfully threatened or intended to threaten” the victim.  Id.  The district court based its reasoning 
on the holding of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) in which the Court held 
that statutes that do not delineate a mens rea requirement should be presumed not to be strict 
liability statutes.  Id. at 148. 
 144.  Id. at 149. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See e.g., United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that true 
threats communicated over the Internet should be interpreted based on whether a reasonable 
recipient under the circumstances would have considered the statement a threat). 
 147.  United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 148.  Id. at 1486. 
 149.  Id. at 1493. 
 150.  Id. at 1494 (holding that “there is no way directly to scrutinize the works of someone 
else’s mind or his state of mind”). 
 151.  Id. at 1493–94. 
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communication, such as the tone of voice of the speaker, the speaker’s 
normal demeanor, and the speaker and recipient’s relationship.152 
3.  A Minority of Courts Have Applied a Hybrid Intent Standard 
That Includes Both Subjective and Objective Elements 
For some courts, neither a completely objective nor a completely 
subjective intent requirement suffices, and the government must show 
elements of both in order to support a conviction for issuing a true threat.153  
For example, in United States v. Bagdasarian,154 the Ninth Circuit adopted 
the reasoning that criminal statutes require a mens rea element in order to 
separate innocent behavior from criminal conduct.155  Therefore, a speaker 
has to demonstrate his or her intent to intimidate or threaten a person, or 
group of persons, both subjectively and objectively.156   The Ninth Circuit 
held that criminal statutes must require a fact-finder to objectively “look at 
the entire factual context of [the] statements including the surrounding 
events, the listeners’ reaction, and whether the words are conditional.”157  
Because Bagdasarian’s statements failed to constitute true threats under 
both an objective and a subjective intent standard, the court reversed his 
conviction.158 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Elonis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and held that 18 
U.S.C. Section 875(c) requires a higher mens rea requirement than general 
intent.159  The Court first examined the plain language of Section 875(c), 
concluding that the statute did not announce a particular intent 
requirement.160  It then relied on the presumption that criminal statutes 
require a mens rea element, and ultimately decided that a purely objective 
                                                          
 152.  Id.  
 153.  See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that true 
threats require both an element of subjective and of objective intent).  
 154.  652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 155.  Id. at 1116–18. 
 156.  Id. at 1116 (holding that a state can only punish a threat “if the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 
(2003))). 
 157.  Id. at 1119 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 158.  Id. at 1117.  The alleged true threats in this case were the defendant’s racially-charged, 
violent posts about President Obama to an online message board, which included links to videos 
of explosions and emails to friends with links to ads for various firearms.  Id. at 1115–16. 
 159.  135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015). 
 160.  Id. 
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standard for true threats could not stand.161  The Elonis Court chose not to 
consider any First Amendment issues, and rejected the argument that its 
failure to announce a concrete intent standard for true threats would 
perpetuate the circuit split.162  Both the concurring and dissenting opinions 
criticized the majority for its failure to clarify the requisite intent standard 
for Section 875(c), and rejected the holding that true threats require a 
showing of subjective intent.163 
The Court began its analysis by evaluating the text of Section 875(c), 
which states that a person who “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce 
any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat 
to injure the person of another shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both.”164  The Court noted that neither the 
government nor Elonis presented a concrete mens rea argument under 
Section 875(c), particularly because the statute itself does not reference 
intent.165 
The Court, relying on precedent, reasoned that although a statute fails 
to mention the specific level of criminal intent necessary for a conviction, a 
requisite level of intent may nevertheless exist.166  The Court found that if a 
statute does not include a standard of intent, it should interpret the statute to 
require “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful 
conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”167  In the context of Facebook 
communications, the Court explained that posting offensive or violent 
material does not automatically qualify those statements as true threats.168  
A person may write violent posts that a court could interpret as innocent 
conduct.169  In evaluating whether Elonis’s statements crossed over into 
wrongful conduct, the Court determined it would focus on the mental state 
Elonis had at the time he made the Facebook posts.170 
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 2011.  
 162.  Id. at 2012–13. 
 163.  Id. at 2013. 
 164.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).  The Court, however, failed to articulate the 
standard.  
 165.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008–09. 
 166.  Id.; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952) (holding that the 
defendant, who took shell casings from a government military test range under the impression 
they were abandoned property, could not be found guilty for “knowingly convert[ing]” 
government property unless he had actual knowledge that the government owned the casings); 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (holding that the Court may not interpret a 
statute that is silent as to the requisite mental state in a way that would criminalize a “broad range 
of apparently innocent conduct”). 
 167.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)). 
 168.  Id. at 2011.  
 169.  Id.  
 170.  Id.   
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By framing the issue this way, the Court rejected the government’s 
argument that because Elonis consciously posted his statements and a 
reasonable person would have considered the posts true threats, Elonis 
acted with sufficient criminal intent under Section 875(c).171  The Court 
found that the government’s approach, which read a negligence standard 
into the statute, does not give rise to criminal liability.172  Because most 
federal criminal statutes expressly mention an intent requirement, the Court 
held Section 875(c) not to be different.173  The Court stressed the 
importance of intent standards in criminal law, particularly because of the 
concern that a negligence standard might lead to punishing individuals for 
innocent activity.174  Therefore, the Court held that Elonis could not be 
convicted merely because a reasonable person would have interpreted his 
Facebook posts as threats.175  A jury would have had to find that Elonis 
consciously engaged in wrongdoing, which could be established if he 
possessed a requisite mental state higher than negligence.176  Though the 
Court found that something more than general intent was required to 
impose criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), it did not specify 
the details of such a standard.177  Because the jury only addressed the issue 
from a negligence standard, the Court held that Elonis’s conviction could 
not stand.178  The Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit, and 
remanded the case so that a jury could consider the facts in light of the 
higher intent standard for Section 875(c).179 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority that 
Section 875(c) required a mental state higher than negligence, but criticized 
the Court for failing to concretely establish the appropriate standard.180  
Justice Alito expressed his concern that the failure to declare the proper 
intent standard would lead to confusion in the lower courts as they would 
likely encounter this issue again.181  Justice Alito wrote that the Court 
granted certiorari in order to resolve a circuit split regarding the requisite 
                                                          
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id.  
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id. at 2012. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  Id. at 2013. 
 178.  Id. at 2012.  The Court held that a negligence standard was not sufficient to support a 
conviction under Section 875(c), and also rejected the arguments of Justice Alito and Justice 
Thomas that the Court should have considered whether recklessness could serve as the proper 
intent standard.  Because no courts of appeals had addressed the recklessness standard, the Elonis 
Court chose not to explore it.  Id. at 2103. 
 179.  Id. at 2013. 
 180.  Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 181.  Id. at 2014.  
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mental state for Section 875(c), and failed to do so.182  Further, Justice Alito 
argued that the proper intent standard for Section 875(c) should be whether 
a person recklessly “disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware,” and 
that the majority should have announced that standard.183  He agreed with 
the majority’s decision to apply the presumption that federal criminal 
statutes typically require some degree of intent.184  Justice Alito argued that 
recklessness properly addresses the need for a higher intent requirement 
than negligence in a criminal statute.185 Furthermore, because Congress was 
silent as to what standard Section 875 requires, Justice Alito believed the 
Court should only apply a slightly higher requirement.186 
Additionally, Justice Alito reasoned that the Court should have 
addressed the First Amendment issue raised by Elonis.187  Elonis argued 
that an intent standard as low as recklessness would violate the First 
Amendment—a claim which Justice Alito strongly rejected.188  Elonis 
claimed that his constitutional right to free speech should have protected 
him from prosecution because he did not consider his Facebook statements 
threats.189  He argued that his writing afforded him therapeutic benefits and 
helped him recover emotionally from the dissolution of his marriage.190  
Justice Alito, in contrast, argued that the Constitution does not, and never 
has, afforded protection for threats.191  Regardless of the alleged benefit 
Elonis received from expressing himself through his posts, Justice Alito 
reasoned that the context behind the posts and their detailed nature 
indicated that Elonis acted recklessly, and caused significant psychological 
harm to the targets of his statements.192  Because Justice Alito believed that 
the statements, when viewed from a recklessness standard, constituted true 
threats, he rejected the argument that the First Amendment protected 
Elonis.193 
Voicing similar concerns on the majority’s failure to resolve the circuit 
split on Section 875(c)’s appropriate mens rea requirement, Justice Thomas 
dissented from the judgment.194  Instead of advocating for a recklessness 
                                                          
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id. at 2015 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 
 184.  Id. at 2014. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id. at 2015.  
 187.  Id. at 2016. 
 188.  Id.  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003); then citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); and then citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 
(1969)).  
 192.  Id.  
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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standard like Justice Alito, however, Justice Thomas argued the Court of 
Appeals had not erred by applying a general intent standard.195  Justice 
Thomas agreed with the majority and Justice Alito that criminal statutes 
typically include some requisite mental state, but argued that statutes 
concerning speech have historically adopted objective, general intent 
standards.196  Justice Thomas argued that a general intent standard 
adequately permits an individual to understand whether his conduct 
constitutes wrongdoing.197  Justice Thomas stressed that even if Elonis did 
not intend his posts as threats, the fact that they contained violent scenarios 
indicated that Elonis acted with sufficient criminal intent.198  Justice 
Thomas rejected the majority’s view that a general intent standard in this 
case would amount to mere negligence.199 Justice Thomas framed his 
interpretation as a factual analysis, rather than focusing on the mental state 
possessed by an individual at the time a threat is made.200  Justice Thomas 
reasoned that the Court should only consider whether the words 
communicated by the defendant fell under the legal definition of a threat, 
and therefore he believed the Court of Appeals had correctly applied a 
general intent standard.201 
Justice Thomas also briefly addressed the First Amendment issue 
raised by Justice Alito, and largely agreed with him.202  Through an 
historical analysis of Supreme Court precedent, Justice Thomas stressed 
that the Court has never allowed threats to enjoy any constitutional 
protection.203  He also argued that the importance of protecting victims 
from threats supersedes the danger that innocent conduct may be punished 
should the Court choose not to adopt a higher standard of intent.204  Given 
that Justice Thomas did not believe the First Amendment protected Elonis’s 
statements and he agreed with the Court of Appeals decision to apply a 
general intent standard to Section 875(c), Justice Thomas argued the Court 
should have affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit.205 
                                                          
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 2019 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; then quoting United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 
1059, 1066 (C.A.4 1994); then citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); and then 
quoting United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (C.A.6 2012)). 
 197.  Id. at 2021.  
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id. at 2023.  
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id. at 2013.  
 202.  Id. at 2024. 
 203.  Id. at 2027 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); then citing Chantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and then citing State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (1941)).  
 204.  Id. at 2028. 
 205.  Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court erred in Elonis v. United States by failing to 
concretely define the intent requirement of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) to 
include speech transmitted through online social networking.206  The Court 
should have treated the two issues—whether Elonis’s Facebook posts 
violated the First Amendment and which intent standard to apply to alleged 
true threats—as one intertwined issue.207  Because the Court chose to 
separate these issues, it missed a vital opportunity to resolve the circuit split 
regarding the proper intent standard for Section 875(c).208  To determine the 
proper intent standard under the true threat doctrine, the Court should have 
considered what standard would ensure that innocent speakers will not face 
punishment, while still providing adequate protection to victims and 
recipients of true threats.209  The Court could have achieved this balance by 
adopting a hybrid standard,  combining the reasonable-speaker and 
reasonable-recipient tests, which would protect the right to free speech 
while allowing for criminal punishment of individuals whose statements fall 
outside the protections of the First Amendment.210  Part IV.A of this Note 
will address the intersection of the true threat doctrine’s development under 
the First Amendment under the presumption that criminal statutes require 
mens rea. 
A.  While The Court Affords Broad Protections for Unpopular and 
Offensive Speech Under the First Amendment, Elonis’s Statements 
Rose to the Level of True Threats 
The Supreme Court has historically required a high burden in order to 
show that statements or behaviors constitute true threats.211  It has 
repeatedly held that communications may not be censored simply because 
they are offensive or express unpopular beliefs.212  However, in the context 
of Elonis’s Internet threats, the statements caused extreme harm to the 
recipients, and therefore constituted true threats punishable under 18 U.S.C. 
Section 875(c).213 Although the Supreme Court did not deem Elonis’s 
statements true threats, they should have because Elonis’s posts did not 
constitute justifiable political speech under Watts, and they amounted to 
threats of intimidation under Brandenburg.214  As discussed in Part II.B 
                                                          
 206.  135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 207.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 208.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 209.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 210.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 211.  See supra Part II.C.  
 212.  See supra Part II.C.  
 213.  See infra text accompanying notes 217–224. 
 214.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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supra, the Court first addressed the issue of true threats in Watts v. United 
States.215  In holding that the defendant’s aggressive statements, directed 
towards the President of the United States, did not constitute true threats, 
the Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of protecting public debate 
and political speech.216  Because many individuals can interpret politically 
charged speech as offensive or abusive, the Court reasoned those elements 
alone cannot serve as a basis for censorship.217  To constitute a true threat, 
the Court held that the communication “must be distinguished from what is 
constitutionally protected speech,” and must do more harm than merely 
making individuals uncomfortable. 218 
In the case of Elonis v. United States, the defendant’s online 
statements exceeded the level of causing mere offense or discomfort, and 
should have qualified under Watts as communications that do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.219  In Watts, the Court emphasized the context of 
the defendant’s statements as a primary basis for their constitutionality.220  
Because the defendant made his threatening statements during a public 
debate involving a highly contested political decision, his statements served 
an important function in American society and were therefore 
constitutional.221  Elonis’s statements, however, had nothing to do with an 
issue of political importance, and were not related to public debate.222  
Instead, Elonis posted graphic material on his social media profile that 
instilled fear in those who viewed it.223  Elonis’s lyrics, directed at 
schoolchildren, park-goers, his ex-wife, FBI agents, and local police 
officers did not contribute to any ongoing public debate, nor did they have 
                                                          
 215.  394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). 
 216.  Id. at 707–08. 
 217.  Id.  
 218.  Id. at 707.  However, the Court did not announce a clear standard for what types of 
speech would qualify as unprotected by the Constitution.  Id. at 708.  It tailored its holding 
narrowly, and argued that the statements at issue in this particular situation did not constitute true 
threats.  Id.  
 219.  Id. at 707 (holding that communications, including threats to inflict bodily harm voiced 
outside the context of a political debate, may qualify as true threats).  
 220.  Id. at 707–08 (reasoning that because the statements occurred at a political debate—a 
setting in which individuals often make emotionally charged statements—the context indicated 
that the defendant’s statements did not constitute true threats and were merely offensive speech). 
 221.  Id. (holding that because the defendant’s statements were typical of political speech, 
which can “often be vituperative, abusive and inexact,” the Court should be conscious of 
protecting the defendant’s First Amendment rights because the right to express personal views, 
however unpopular, is a constitutionally protected value). 
 222.  See infra Part III. 
 223.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015).  At Elonis’s trial, multiple 
individuals testified that they found his posts extremely disturbing and that they were afraid for 
their safety after reading them.  Id. at 2005–07.  Furthermore, Elonis’s wife obtained a Protection 
From Abuse order after she became aware of the posts directed at her, which included extensively 
detailed scenarios of how Elonis wished her to die.  Id. at 2006. 
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any social value.224  The Watts Court stressed the importance of interpreting 
statements “with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in 
mind.”225  Because the First Amendment prohibits censoring speech unless 
that speech causes harm, the Court should extend protection to public 
debates such as in Watts, but should not allow individuals to make 
continuous violent and threatening communications toward others.226 
The Supreme Court also should have ruled that Elonis’s statements 
constituted true threats because they were acts of intimidation.227  In 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a statute may not 
criminalize statements or conduct simply because they advocate 
traditionally unpopular beliefs.228  To amount to behavior that violates the 
First Amendment, the Court found that a person’s acts or statements must 
incite violence, or at least render the possibility of violence imminent and 
likely to occur.229  While Elonis’s statements failed to incite any acts of 
violence, he did call for abusive action, particularly in the posts directed at 
his ex-wife.230   These posts did not call upon any particular individual to 
commit a violent act against Elonis’s ex-wife, but they did cause her to 
obtain a Protection From Abuse order, indicating she feared a likely and 
imminent attack on her safety.231  Elonis’s Facebook posts fortunately did 
not result in violence, but the level of detail with which he described plans 
to kill his wife could certainly have resulted in harm.232 
                                                          
 224.  Id. at 2007; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (holding 
that the prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that threatened violence will occur”); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) (holding communications whose benefits “are 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” may be restricted under the First 
Amendment (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83)); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE 200 (2014) (explaining that true threats are not constitutionally protected speech 
because “low-value speech can be regulated due to [its] propensity to bring about serious harms 
and slight contribution to free speech values”). 
 225.  Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
 226.  See id. (holding “[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech” and that while public debate often may not be censored, speech that 
communicates an intent to commit bodily harm against another qualifies as a true threat). 
 227.  See infra text accompanying note 230. 
 228.  395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam). 
 229.  Id. at 448–49. 
 230.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005–06 (2015). Elonis provided an 
accurate map depicting his wife’s home as a caption to one of his Facebook posts that stated it 
would be illegal for him to state that someone should kill his wife with a mortar launcher.  Id.  The 
map included the best location for someone to position his or herself outside the home in order to 
have a clear shot into the home.  Id.  
 231.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (holding that a statute 
cannot punish statements that merely advocate for a cause, but may punish statements if they 
incite violence that is imminent and likely to occur). 
 232.  See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06; supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
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The Supreme Court has clearly announced that acts of intimidation 
may qualify as true threats.233  Its decisions in cases involving cross 
burning, however, indicate that mere use of an offensive symbol does not 
amount to intimidation.234  In Elonis, however, the defendant’s statements 
were directed at identifiable individuals and contained detailed descriptions 
of violence.235  They could therefore be distinguished from categories of 
behavior such as cross burning that the Court traditionally has held does not 
amount to a true threat.236  The Court struck down statutes criminalizing 
cross burning in both R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota and Virginia v. 
Black on the grounds that an act itself cannot serve as evidence of a 
person’s intent to intimidate.237   However, the Court emphasized that 
statements that threaten imminent violence do not enjoy First Amendment 
protection.238  Because Elonis specifically targeted individuals, such as his 
ex-wife and the FBI agent who visited him at his home, his statements 
amounted to more than a symbol of violence and intimidation.239  Elonis’s 
statements had an identifiable impact on their recipients, and the Court 
should have understood them as true threats of violence.240 
B.  The Court’s Use of Subjective Intent in Virginia v. Black Only 
Applies in the Context of the Challenged State Statute, and 
Therefore Does Not Apply to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c) 
Prior to its decision in Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court had never 
before included an element of subjective intent in its definition of true 
threats.241  However, the Supreme Court’s insertion of a subjective element 
for true threats in Virginia v. Black should only be read in context of that 
specific, challenged state statute.242  The Black Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a Virginia state statute banning the burning of crosses 
                                                          
 233.  See supra Part II.C.  
 234.  See supra Part II.C. 
 235.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007. 
 236.  See supra Part II.C.  
 237.  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 
(2003). 
 238.  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
 239.  135 S. Ct. at 2005–07; see Megan Chester, Lost in Translation: The Case for the Addition 
of a Directness Test in Online True Threat Analysis, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 395, 398 (2015) 
(arguing that because social media presents unique difficulties when it comes to understanding 
how serious a person’s statements are meant due to the lack of body language and tone of voice, 
the Court should consider the directness of the speech through objective evaluation of the 
statement’s recipient in order to define it as a true threat).  
 240.  See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.  The victims of Elonis’s Facebook posts testified to the 
fear that they experienced after viewing Mr. Elonis’s statements.  Id.  
 241.  See supra Part II.C. 
 242.  See Black, 538 U.S. at 364 (holding that the statute at issue was unconstitutional because 
it contained a provision stating that burning a cross would be prima facie evidence of intimidation, 
which criminalized a range of behavior that was too broad).  
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“with an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”243  Unlike 
federal statutes that prohibit true threats, such as Section 875(c) under 
which Elonis was charged, the challenged state statute in Virginia v. Black 
had always included an element of subjective intent.244 
Furthermore, the issue that the Black Court faced did not involve 
determining the proper standard of intent to apply to the Virginia cross-
burning statute.245  Rather, the Court addressed whether the act of burning a 
cross could serve as prima facie evidence of the intent to intimidate a group 
of persons.246  Unlike the challenge in Elonis, which focused directly on 
whether Section 875(c) required a showing of general or specific intent, the 
Virginia v. Black issue involved what level of evidence was required to 
establish whether an individual’s cross burning constituted an act of 
intimidation.247  Although the Court struck down the statute at issue in 
Virginia v. Black, it stressed that a state may restrict speech when the 
“benefits . . . [are] clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”248  This logic indicates that the Court would not consider every 
statute limiting free speech in the context of intimidation as a violation of 
the First Amendment, particularly if the speech limited did not serve a 
socially valuable interest.249  Ultimately, the Court rejected the Virginia 
statute because it criminalized the act of cross burning in an impermissibly 
broad manner.250  Keeping this context at the forefront, Virginia v. Black 
should not be read as requiring an element of subjective intent for true 
threats.  Instead, its application should be limited to evaluating the scope of 
behavior a statute may limit.251 
C.  The Court Should Have Announced a Concrete Intent Standard for 
18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), Requiring a Combination of the 
Reasonable-Recipient and Reasonable-Speaker Tests 
As discussed in Part II.D supra, the circuit courts have struggled to 
agree on which intent standard properly governs true threats.252  Aside from 
                                                          
 243.  Id. at 347. 
 244.  Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 245.  Black, 538 U.S. at 347 (defining the issue as “whether the Commonwealth of Virginia’s 
statute banning cross burning with ‘an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons’ violates 
the First Amendment” (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–423 (1996))). 
 246.  Id. at 351.  The Court granted certiorari to determine whether a jury instruction “that the 
burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent” 
was unconstitutional.  Id. at 350–51. 
 247.  Id. at 362–63. 
 248.  Id. at 358–59 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)).  
 249.  Id. at 363.  
 250.  Id. at 364. 
 251.  Id.  
 252.  See supra Part II.D. 
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Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court’s definition of true threats has 
remained silent as to the required element of intent, and prior to Elonis v. 
United States, the Court had never evaluated the intent issue.253  Rather than 
taking the opportunity to announce the proper mens rea requirement for 
issuing a true threat, however, the Elonis Court failed to address the current 
circuit split.254  The Court did acknowledge that Congress failed to 
delineate the required mental state for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), but it 
nonetheless chose not to resolve this statutory ambiguity.255  Although the 
Court rejected a fully objective intent requirement for true threats, it did not 
elaborate on a better alternative, and instead left this decision up to the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on remand.256  The hesitance of the 
Supreme Court to announce the proper intent requirement under Section 
875(c) not only perpetuates the disagreement between the circuit courts, but 
it also leaves individuals without a concrete standard under which to ensure 
their conduct does not warrant criminal charges.257 
The Supreme Court should have adopted a hybrid, reasonable-speaker 
and reasonable-recipient intent standard for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c).258  
The hybrid reasonable-speaker and reasonable-recipient test heightens the 
scrutiny from an objective standard by requiring juries to consider how the 
person issuing the statement and the targeted individual interpreted the 
statement.259  It therefore provides a workable principle under which  courts 
may assess true threats.260  Because a purely subjective or purely objective 
intent standard would compromise the ultimate goals of the true threat 
doctrine—to protect individual free speech while shielding victims from the 
harmful consequences of threats—this hybrid standard would help courts to 
achieve both aims.261  A purely objective standard too often results in 
censorship to speech that should enjoy the protections of the First 
                                                          
 253.  See supra Part II.C. 
 254.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015).  The Court stated that no 
significant circuit split existed regarding the proper standard of intent for 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and 
reasoned that by requiring more than a negligence standard, the courts of appeals would have 
sufficient guidance on how to interpret true threats in future cases.  Id.  
 255.  Id. at 2008–09.  
 256.  Id. at 2009 (holding that negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under Section 
875(c)). 
 257.  See Scheffey, supra note 2 (arguing that “[a]s a result of the tension created by the circuit 
courts conflicting standards for assessing the requisite intent for true threats, it is nearly 
impossible for a speaker whose words could easily reach any circuit via the Internet to predict 
what speech is protected and what speech is not”). 
 258.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 259.  See Chester, supra note 239, at 407–09 (arguing that a purely objective test that fails to 
require any subjective element restricts free speech in violation of the First Amendment; therefore, 
there should be some consideration of the speaker’s motives in evaluating true threats). 
 260.  Id.  
 261.  See infra Part II.C. 
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Amendment.262  While a purely subjective intent standard presents too high 
of a burden of proof by requiring prosecutors to prove an individual’s actual 
motives in issuing potential threats, the reasonable-speaker and reasonable-
recipient combination standard provides a perfect balance.263   
1.  A Purely Objective Intent Standard Impermissibly Limits the 
First Amendment 
In analyzing the proper intent standard for 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c), 
the Court should have considered the purpose of the true threat doctrine. 
The substance of the debate in the circuits over whether to apply a 
subjective or objective element of intent primarily concerns how best to 
protect individuals from intimidation and fear of bodily harm while 
upholding the constitutional protections of free speech.264  Throughout the 
development of the true threat doctrine, the Supreme Court has strongly 
emphasized that unpopular and vulgar speech still enjoys First Amendment 
protection, and consequently, has set a high standard for determining what 
activities qualify as unconstitutional.265  The Court almost always, however, 
includes a caveat that states have an interest in banning intimidation and in 
curtailing speech that has little-to-no social value.266  In Elonis v. United 
States, the Supreme Court argued that a purely objective intent standard, 
which amounts to negligence in the criminal law, does not afford enough 
protection to free speech.267  The Court stressed that a purely reasonable-
person standard, which would only evaluate how a reasonable person would 
interpret a statement, does not adequately address the dual mental state 
requirements of criminal law.268 
In the context of Internet threats, many scholars agree that a purely 
objective standard criminalizes behavior that actually constitutes 
constitutionally protected speech.269  Scholars argue that the unique 
                                                          
 262.  See infra Part II.C.  
 263.  See infra Part II.C.  
 264.  See generally Scheffey, supra note 2, at 876–77 (arguing that confusion persists among 
the circuits over what degree of objectivity or subjectivity must be shown in order to convict for 
true threats, and explaining that purely objective standards result in too many convictions, whereas 
purely subjective standards often provide too little relief for victims of violent online posts); see 
also CITRON, supra note 224, at 201 (explaining that true threats do not enjoy constitutional 
protection because they “generate profound fear of physical harm that disrupts victims’ daily 
lives” and lead to “extreme emotional disturbance”). 
 265.  See supra Part II.  
 266.  See supra Part III. 
 267.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (holding that “wrongdoing must be 
conscious to be criminal” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))).  
 268.  Id. at 2011. 
 269.  See Thomas DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach 
to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social 
Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 1013–14 (2014) (arguing that individuals who engage in 
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intersection between publicity and privacy that social media profiles occupy 
allows users to communicate more candidly than they might in other 
mediums.270  These scholars typically advocate a more stringent, subjective 
intent requirement for true threat statutes because so many individuals 
posting on the Internet fail to appreciate how their statements might be 
interpreted by those who view them.271  Furthermore, the semi-public 
nature of a statement made over social media makes it difficult to ascertain 
the author’s actual intended audience, and can result in unwarranted fear by 
those who read statements out of context.272  These concerns are rooted in 
the notion that statutes cannot criminalize innocent behavior, and applying a 
loose standard of intent for true threats would result in unwarranted 
convictions.273 
Additionally, a purely objective, reasonable-recipient standard poses 
the danger that juries will be overly sympathetic to victims.274  Although 
this standard requires jurors to consider statements in light of how a 
reasonable person might interpret them, juries often hear direct testimony 
from victims of the statements.275  By listening to how the statements have 
negatively affected these victims, jurors can be swayed by sympathy, 
making it harder to analyze the situation from the viewpoint of an 
objectively reasonable person.276  Furthermore, in cases that involve 
                                                          
communications over social media are less likely to consider their lack of privacy; therefore, a 
purely objective standard punishes behavior that, while irresponsible, does not rise to a criminal 
level). 
 270.  Id. at 1010 (stating that “[s]tudies show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous 
and knows the recipient of his communicated message, the speaker is more likely to be 
disinhibited when engaged in computer-mediated communication than in other types of 
communications”). 
 271.  See Chester, supra note 239, at 407–08.  Chester argues that applying an intent standard 
that fails to take into consideration the speaker’s intent may restrict free speech because individual 
posters often don’t appreciate that their online profiles might be widely viewable.  Additionally, 
many “status” updates are not intended to be directed at one particular person on the Internet, and 
therefore, without considering the intent of the Facebook user, and only relying on how an 
objective person might interpret a generalized statement, a person’s innocent speech could be 
mistakenly criminalized.  Id. 
 272.  See DeBauche, supra note 269, at 984 (arguing that adopting a reasonable recipient intent 
standard for online communications puts First Amendment rights at risk because individuals 
viewing posts might not be able to understand the context or perspective of the person posting, 
and, therefore, the posts can too easily be interpreted as threats). 
 273.  See United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 426–27 (holding that statutes cannot be read 
as criminalizing innocent behavior and when they are, courts should require a higher standard of 
intent). 
 274.  United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding a reasonable-
speaker test “better avoids the perils that inhere in the ‘reasonable-recipient standard,’ namely that 
the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient”). 
 275. See e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015).  The government called as 
a witness at least one member of each group that Elonis was charged with directing threats toward 
in the original indictment.  Id.  
 276.  See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
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particularly sensitive recipients, a juror may be more inclined to convict a 
defendant based on the emotional reaction of the victim, rather than on the 
objective evaluation of the statement itself.277  For these reasons, many 
courts and scholars advocate applying a higher level of scrutiny to the 
required intent of a true threat.278 
2.  A Purely Subjective Intent Standard for True Threats Fails to 
Adequately Protect Victims of Violent Communications 
While protecting an individual’s ability to post his or her opinions and 
express his or her personal views online should certainly be a priority for 
courts and for Congress, applying a purely subjective intent standard raises 
concerns that true threats would be too hard to prove in the context of social 
media.279  In United States v. Fulmer,280 the court rejected the defendant’s 
claim that true threats require a showing of subjective intent and held that 
“there is no way to directly scrutinize the works of someone else’s mind or 
his state of mind.”281  Requiring a prosecutor to show, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that a defendant clearly intended to instill the fear of bodily harm in 
the targets of Facebook posts or other Internet communications provides too 
high a protection for online posters whose statements cause substantial 
psychological harm to those who read them.282 
3.  A Hybrid Reasonable-Speaker and Reasonable-Recipient Intent 
Standard Protects Both an Individual’s First Amendment Rights 
and the Potential Victims of True Threats 
In order to strike a balance between the overly broad objective-
recipient standard, which risks criminalizing innocent behavior, and the 
extremely difficult-to-prove subjective intent standard, courts should 
instead apply a hybrid, reasonable-recipient and reasonable-speaker test.283   
                                                          
 277.  See Scheffey, supra note 2, at 883 (explaining the flaws in a reasonable-recipient 
standard because juries process information based on the demeanor of the victim on the stand and 
the test “fails to weed out overly sensitive recipients or jurors”). 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  See Chester, supra note 239, at 409 (arguing that purely subjective intent standards may 
afford greater protections to free speech but still result in difficulties for just prosecution because 
no concrete test to determine what a person truly thought at the time he or she issued an Internet 
post exists). 
 280. 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 281.  Id. at 1494. 
 282.  See CITRON, supra note 224, at 212–18 (discussing the severe consequences victims of 
online threats endure, including fear, psychological harm, and emotional distress, and highlighting 
that the First Amendment does not protect true threats that cause these damaging mental 
responses).  
 283.  See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
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The reasonable-speaker test evaluates intent based on whether a person 
“should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be 
taken as a threat by those to whom it is made.”284  Adding an element of 
intent from the perspective of the speaker raises the level of scrutiny above 
a fully objective intent standard, and therefore may prevent innocent 
speakers from facing criminal charges.285 
Combining the reasonable-speaker test with the reasonable-recipient 
test also protects First Amendment rights because it ensures that a jury will 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that both the speaker and the recipient 
would interpret the statement as a threat.286  This intent standard helps to 
protect the rights of both parties involved.287  Individuals posting offensive 
or violent statements would be adequately protected because, in order to 
constitute a true threat, a jury would have to find that both a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a threat, 
and that a reasonable recipient would interpret it as a threat.288  Adding this 
extra element of protection helps to ensure that individuals do not face 
punishment for voicing unpopular opinions.289  This hybrid intent standard 
also protects potential victims of true threats because the burden of proof is 
not as high as it would be under a purely subjective standard.290  By 
combining both the reasonable-speaker and reasonable-recipient tests to 
create a dual intent standard, the Court would serve both the victims’ 
interest in protecting against threats and the First Amendment rights of the 
speaker.291 
In Elonis v. United States, the Court should have explicitly adopted 
this combination standard of intent.  This adoption would have resolved the 
circuit split and provided clarity to the modern true threat doctrine.292  
Instead, the Court emphasized that the reasonable-recipient standard 
employed by the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis constituted an 
                                                          
 284.  Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491. 
 285.  Id. (arguing for a reasonable-speaker test and against a reasonable-recipient test because 
“a defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find 
threatening because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant”). 
 286.  See supra Part IV.C.  
 287.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 288.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 289.  See CITRON, supra note 224, at 199 (explaining “[a] bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment is that government cannot censor the expression of an idea because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or distasteful”); see also Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491 (holding that a 
reasonable-recipient standard does not adequately protect the First Amendment rights of speakers 
because it results in convictions based on jury members’ sympathies for victims rather than on 
factual context of alleged threats). 
 290.  See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494 (arguing that a purely subjective intent standard results in 
an extremely difficult burden of proof for the prosecution because it is nearly impossible to prove 
what another person was thinking). 
 291.  See text accompanying note 288.  
 292.  See supra Part IV.C.  
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impermissibly lenient intent requirement.293  The Court reasoned that only 
evaluating Elonis’s Facebook posts from the perspective of his ex-wife, his 
co-workers, the local police departments, and the FBI agents who 
investigated him—without considering Elonis’s motives in issuing the 
statements—resulted in a conviction that could not stand.294  The recipients 
of Elonis’s communications clearly interpreted the posts as threats, and 
suffered from fear and psychological distress as a result of viewing them.295  
The reactions of those who Elonis targeted in his posts should not have 
been ignored by the Court.296  Instead, the Court should have also 
considered Elonis’s statements from the perspective of a reasonable 
speaker.  Elonis’s statements contained extremely violent descriptions 
targeted at identifiable individuals.297  Due to the graphic language used by 
Elonis and the specificity of his posts, a reasonable person should have 
known that these statements would be interpreted by those who viewed 
them as credible threats.298  Both a reasonable-speaker and a reasonable-
recipient would have understood Elonis’s communications as true threats.  
Because this hybrid test serves the dual interests of the true threat doctrine, 
the Court should have adopted this intent standard and upheld Elonis’s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court erred by failing to 
announce a concrete intent requirement to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c).299  
Because Supreme Court precedent on the true threat doctrine never 
explicitly decided the issue of intent for true threats, the circuits have split 
on which standard to apply.300  This circuit split not only results in 
inconsistent decisions within the courts; it also leads to ambiguity for 
individuals trying to determine what forms of communication are truly 
protected by the First Amendment.301  While the Court was correct in 
rejecting a purely objective intent standard and choosing not to adopt a fully 
subjective intent requirement, it should have held that Elonis’s statements 
qualified as true threats.  Had the Court adopted a hybrid reasonable-
speaker and reasonable-recipient test for intent, it would have resolved the 
                                                          
 293.  See supra Part III. 
 294.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015). 
 295.  See supra Part IV.A.  
 296.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 297.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.  
 298.  See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that including 
an element of intent based on the perspective of a reasonable speaker allows a jury to “tak[e] into 
account the factual context in which the statement was made”). 
 299.  135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 300.  See supra Part II.C.  
 301.  See supra Part IV. 
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circuit split and solidified a standard that both protects the right to free 
speech and simultaneously allows victims of true threats to receive justice 
against those who instilled in them fear, intimidation, and emotional 
distress.302 
 
 
                                                          
 302.  See supra Part IV.C.  
